



Feasibility Study

on Civil Society Fund (CSF)

In Cambodia

Cooperation Committee for Cambodia



By Ou Sivhuoch and Chheat Sreang

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Partnerships for Sustainable Development in Cambodia



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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Cambodian CSOs over the last 2.5 decades have significantly contributed to promoting the country's development agenda. Looking ahead, CSOs are supposed to collaborate with the royal government of Cambodia to realizing Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Taken together, many persistent issues await CSOs' helping hand, be it pocket of poverty in remote areas, economic and social inequality and exclusion, land rights issues within indigenous and non-indigenous communities, child malnutrition, human rights abuses, gender inequality, diseases, health, disability, education, rural-urban divides, environment degradation, and so on.

However, it is widely noticed recently that CSOs' fund has decreased. If so, to what extent funding has declined, among who, what impact is felt by CSOs, and what CSOs could do to mitigate the consequences. These questions justify undertaking this research on Feasibility Study on Civil Society Fund (CSF) in Cambodia, which eventually attempts to avert the risks instigated by the shrinking CSOs' fund so that CSO's operations are sustained, permitting them to cooperate with the royal government in realizing SDGs and other development goals. In this light, this study develops these objectives:

1. To unpack the current status and trends of CSOs' funding
2. To examine CSOs' capacity and experiences in mobilizing and diversifying funding sources
3. To map out the functionality of Civil Society Fund (CSF) or any other funding management modality for Cambodian CSOs, as well as the potential opportunities and risks associated with the emerging modality

Review of relevant literature and interviews with forty informants lead the following discovery. From around 2000, funding for CSOs has declined by approximately 17 per cent across the board. However, for some donors, their financial support remains indifferent, yet they have supported less local NGOs than before. In other cases, donors appear to fund foreign NGOs than local NGOs. Other donors shifted their support from one region of Cambodia to another. As a result of these changes, a number of NGOs, especially local organizations at the provincial level, have reduced scope of operations, frozen some activities, laid off staff, and closed offices. Likewise, a number of NGOs, whose agendas are dissimilar to those of donors and are unable to de facto commercializing activities, face financial downturn, crisis, and closure; examples include NGOs operating on legal aid, disability, decentralization, and some community welfare areas. Evidently, weak NGOs risk losing from Cambodia's NGO landscape.

Unsurprisingly, some established foreign NGOs have enjoyed stable funding—particularly NGOs that are established and possess high managerial and networking capacity, and those whose missions are on donors’ agendas. Other NGOs that are able to adjust themselves by generating incomes to achieve their social goals have continued to flourish; a number of social enterprises have survived as well.

The financial downfall and new donors’ support strategies have occurred when Cambodia has achieved remarkable annual economic growth of more than 7 per cent for nearly two decades. That implies some segments of Cambodian society have been better off. Therefore, it is high time a local initiative of CSF undertook its mission to develop Cambodian civil society in a sustainable fashion. This clearly offers a reason for CSF to emerge with key objectives as follows:

- 1) serving as a Cambodian center which mobilizes, raises, and manage fund, as well as develops capacity for local CSO financial sustainability,
- 2) providing grants to some local NGOs that deserve support or some emergency activities falling out of the scope of current donors and various foreign NGOs, and providing sponsorship to multi-stakeholder initiative/projects¹ for development where relevant,
- 3) empowering the local Cambodian (the rich, individuals, and the private sector) to pool fund for CSOs’ operations, and
- 4) offering concessional loans to, say, Community Based Ecotourism so that CSF can endure and expand in the long run.

In this light, CSF’s services and coverage comprise: 1) providing grants to service delivery local NGOs and CBOs that embed advocacy with their service delivery programs in ways acceptable to the contemporary political regime, 2) doing long term awareness raising activities among potential donors and the public so as to raise fund for development works, 3) conducting fundraising and funding mobilization work, 4) investing to financially sustain civil society activities, 5) providing training on networking skills, and grant proposal writing to investees, permitting them mobilize and diversify funding sources themselves, and 6) offering counseling and advice to needed NGOs and CBOs.

CSF committee may consist of six members: a coordinator, one representative from CCC, one CCC’s member, one CCC donor representative, one representative from the private sector, and an abbot from a Buddhist pagoda. Legality, CSF should stay embedded with CCC so as to be

¹ Some donors or private sector groups wish to join the CSF because they could fund to support the joint projects and build their mutual ownership on them.

protected financially and legally by CCC, especially in the early years of establishment. Currently it is wise for CSF to use existing CCC's Board of Directors.

Moving on, persuading donors to directly fund CSF is a feasible yet bold move. In the same way, in contemporary Cambodia the middle class, individuals, the rich, and Cambodian diasporas do not yet share a common understating about what they collectively could do to fight poverty, hunger and child malnutrition, reduce inequality, provide opportunities to disadvantaged kids, enhance gender equality, sustain the environment, and so on. For that reason, CSF represents a long term and painful commitment before these potential and sustained resources could be extracted. In this regards, for CSF to materialize, CCC is to be very serious and committed in this undertaking. The following steps should be taken:

1. Recruit an exceptionally knowledgeable coordinator who can work with CCC to lobby various donors, foreign embassies, potential members of CCC, scholars, potential business men, the government of Cambodia, and Buddhist abbots about the significance and demands of CSF. The other five members of CSF committee could be invited to join CSF during the lobbying process. The coordinator additionally requires high entrepreneurial capacity to utilize and expand the existing fund of USD 150,000 in a manner that helps but not harm the society.
2. For CSF to represent a model of excellence in nurturing Cambodian civil society in a more productive ways than current arrangements, CSF may configure its identity, ideally as an *investor* of social change. SCF as an investor will share risks and success with *investees*—CSF works as a partner with grantees and not as a donor, builds capacity of investees to achieving self-reliance and autonomy.
3. The CSF coordinator, and possibly two other CSF committee members, are advised to do field visits to successful grant-making organizations such as those in the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Foundation for Civil Society in the Tanzania. Furthermore, locally, specific meetings between the coordinator and the leadership of Aide et Action and a few talented leaders of social enterprises, and potential successful business individuals is equally advised.

CSF inherently involves the politics of scarce resource mobilization and distribution; therefore, it requires a lot of preparation, innovative and rigorous efforts before it can take off. Optimistically, once the momentum of CSF is gained, current concerns will be gradually erased. A similar initiative works in Tanzania and elsewhere, why does it not work in Cambodia?

LIST OF ACRONYMS

AECID	Spanish Cooperation Agency for International Development
AfD	French Development Agency
AusAid	Australian Agency for International Development
BCV	Building Community Voice
CBET	Community-Based Eco Tourism
CCC	Cooperation Committee for Cambodia
DCA	DanChurchAid
CDC	Council for Development of Cambodia
CDMD	Cambodian Development Mission for Disability
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CSF	Civil Society Fund
CSO	Civil Society Organization
CSR	Cooperation Social Responsibility
CzDA	Czech Development Agency
DANIDA	Danish International Development Agency
DCI	Department of Cooperation Ireland
DFAT	Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
DFID	Department for International Development of Britain
DP	Development Partner
EU	European Union
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GIZ	German Society for International Cooperation
GPP	NGO Governance and Professional Practices
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
IUCN	International Union for Conservation of Nature

KAPE	Kampuchean Action for Primary Education
LNGO	Law on Association and Non-Governmental Organization
LRC	Local Resource Centre, Myanmar
NATO	Northern Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDI	National Democratic Institute
NEP	NGO Education Partnership of Cambodia
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
ODA	Official Development Assistance
PNKS	Ponleu Ney Kdey Sangkhum (Light of Hope)
PTCF	Prek Trapaeng Community Fisheries
RNE	The Royal Netherlands Embassy
SDC	Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
Sida	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
UN	United Nations
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

I. INTRODUCTION

Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) or Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) emerged exponentially across the Global North and Global South during the 1980s and 1990s. Donors in the West NGOs believed that NGOs had potential in promoting two fundamental objectives in post-communist states such as Cambodia – service provision and promotion of human rights, democracy, and good governance when those states remain unable to deliver basic public goods (Hulme & Michael, 1997).

NGOs in Cambodia, likewise, sprang up in the early 1990s like an explosion (Ou, 2006). At the time, one commentator describes the phenomenon as money chasing NGOs (Öjendal, 2014) because there was *always* money for NGOs to set up and operate. Further, there was wider and favorable political space for NGOs to emerge, which was enabled by the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). In 1992, there was only one NGO called Khemara; by 2012, 4,378 CSOs were registered. However, based on a 2012 census, only 1,315 CSOs² were open (CCC, 2013). Since 2012, the number of active CSOs may have declined further as explained below.

The fact that more than 70 percent of CSOs have closed is not an accident, primarily it is caused by resource drop. First, the European Union collectively has experienced economic problems, causing the member states to have recently mobilized less taxes and revenues³. At the same time, the EU member states have spent more resources on internal security since the September 11 terrorist attack. Interestingly since the United States' President Donald Trump took office, his administration has taken less financial responsibility of the Northern Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and demanded Europe to pay more for NATO's operations. That development has added more financial burdens on the EU. Simultaneously, the EU states have diverted some fund from funding Cambodia and other developing countries to handle immigrants from Syria⁴.

Second, Cambodia had achieved remarkable 7.6 per cent of annual GDP growth between 1994 and 2015 (WB, 2017). With the high growth, the country has significantly reduced poverty from 47.8 per cent in 2007 to 13.5 per cent in 2014 (ibid). Hence, Cambodia graduated to a Lower Middle Income country in 2016. Therefore some donor agencies such as the Danish International

² Registered either with the Ministry of Interior or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

³ Authors' personal interview with a consultant 04, Phnom Penh, August 21, 2017

⁴ and to assist the Syrian state to stop and reduce the number of Syrians from leaving the country

Development Agency (DANIDA), the Department for International Development (DFID) of Britain, Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), and the Spanish Cooperation Agency for International Development (AECID) have closed their offices in Cambodia⁵. One key informant warned that while other donors such as the French Development Agency, GIZ⁶ (of Germany), [French Development Agency](#) (AfD), the [Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency](#) (Sida), [Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation](#) (SDC), and the [Czech Development Agency](#) (CzDA) stay in Cambodia, the aid provision might not last long⁷. Third, as a consequence of Cambodia's strong economic performance, donors have reduced some funding for Cambodian CSOs and diverted it elsewhere such as Nepal, Myanmar, and Africa⁸.

Research Objectives

Even though Cambodia has significantly reduced poverty, the state still needs support from CSOs to resolve many pressing issues, be it pocket of poverty in remote areas, inequality, land rights issues within indigenous and non-indigenous communities, child malnutrition, human rights abuses, gender, diseases, health, disability, education, rural-urban divides, environment degradation, and so on. That means CSOs still have a crucial mission in working hand in hand with the Royal Government of Cambodia to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals. However, without sustained funding, CSOs will be unable to accomplish their mission. That said, it is high time CSOs generated and ensured sustainable sources of incomes. Therefore this study develops the following objectives:

1. To unpack the current status and trends of CSOs' funding
2. To examine CSOs' capacity and experiences in mobilizing and diversifying funding sources
3. To map out the functionality of Civil Society Fund (CSF) or any other funding management modality for Cambodian CSOs, as well as the potential opportunities and risks associated with the emerging modality

⁵ Authors' personal interview with donor 03, Phnom Penh, July 04, 2017; Authors' personal interview with a consultant 02, Phnom Penh, August 10, 2017

⁶ German Society for International Cooperation

⁷ Authors' personal interview with donor 03, Phnom Penh, July 04, 2017. This is an empirical snapshot, for more detailed and accurate ODA development to Cambodia, see CDC (2016).

⁸ Author's personal interview with LNGO 03, Phnom Penh, June 23, 2017

Research Methodology

In order to meet the objectives of this assignment, the following methodological activities were employed:

Literature Review: This analytical activity entails rigorous review of existing literature on international aid and development of civil society in Cambodia in order to provide context of both the global aid enterprise and how that has affected on civil society's role, or the lack thereof, in Cambodia's development. Specific attention has been paid to the current development context, which has a huge influence on how decision on international aid has been made, and which is relevant to Cambodia.

Key Informant Interview: The interviews with **forty** leaders of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), both local and international, leaders of the business community, and those people who are knowledgeable of Cambodia's socio-economic and political development are a strong foundation for the analysis of the topic under investigation. These people provide both their experiences and knowledge of civil society's role in Cambodia's development, its success and challenges, the knowledge that is critical for decision on how to make its future brighter and even more relevant for changing international aid landscape and Cambodia's development reality. Again, these leaders who have worked in different sectors also shared with us what the future might hold with regards to civil society's role and how it can expand their resource base amid Cambodia's gradual economic growth and changing international aid environment. Our analysis reflects the overall development of civil society and their funding in Cambodia and beyond, as captured in the **forty interviews**. To improve the flow of reading, references to interviews are provided in footnotes.

Consultation: Preliminary findings were presented to CCC's leadership and Research Advisory Board (RAB) for comments and inputs. With their relevant and useful experiences in the field, their deep knowledge of the issues, and their vision of the future, their inputs are taken into consideration, and have been critical for our presentation of facts, perspectives, and discussions on the topic of civil society fund.

II. STATUS AND TRENDS OF FUNDING FOR CSOS IN CAMBODIA

Cambodia is one of the heavily aid dependent countries. In the 2000s, Official Development Assistance (ODA) represented approximately half of Cambodia’s annual budget. While ODA peaked in 2012, reaching USD1.5 billion, it started to decline from 2013 to 2015; especially the proportion of grants has decreased and loan risen (CDC, 2016). In 2015, ODA was USD1.35 billion, which was 10 per cent lower than the 2012 share (ibid).

Table 01: Total Disbursement including NGO funding 2011-2015 (USD million)

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Total	1,422.5	1,499.2	1,478.8	1,443.9	1,343.1

Sources: (CDC, 2014, 2015, 2016)

Table 02: NGO self-reporting funding 2011-2015 (USD million)

	2011			2012			2013			2014			2015		
	NGO Own	DPs ⁹	Total	NGO Own	DPs	Total	NGO Own	DPs	Total	NGO Own	DPs	Total	NGO Own	DPs	Total
Total	194.8	90.4	285.2	212.5	89.6	301.9	225.7	93.1	319	231.3	96.7	328.1	227.9	100.9	328.8

Sources: (CDC, 2014, 2015, 2016)

NGOs’ share of the ODA has been significant, constituting approximately 20 per cent of the total ODA. Table 01 above displays that ODA for Cambodia at large has declined since 2013. To the contrary, funding of 439 NGOs self-reporting, shown in Table 02, to CDC appears stable between 2011 and 2015 (CDC, 2016).

However, more than 1, 000 NGOs are active in Cambodia and their overall resources started to decline from 2000s¹⁰ (Parks, 2008). Sothy Khieng (2014) illustrates the dwindling NGO funding

⁹ Development partners

by comparing data from an NGO survey conducted among 185 NGOs in 2006 (CDC, 2006) and his data collected in 2011 among 312 NGOs (89 foreign NGOs and 223 local NGOs) (Khieng, 2014). Khieng discovered that the composition of grants and donations of NGOs declined considerably at 17 points from 92 per cent in 2006 to 75 per cent in 2011 (ibid). At the same time, NGOs’ own income increased from 6 per cent in 2006 to 21.2 per cent in 2011, indicating that NGOs have faced financial decline and have sought other avenues for survival (ibid). Table 03 illuminates the entirety of foreign NGOs’ funding development. Figures and analyses by Parks and Khieng are more accurate than CDC’s because they randomly and objectively cover enough samples, which allow for a reliable extrapolation. CDC’s figure only presents some 439 NGOs that voluntarily self-report their funding but does not cover the whole budget of NGOs operating in the country. Further, the findings by Parks and Khieng precisely reflect the contemporary declining CSO fund in Cambodia.

Table 03: Development of NGO Funding Shares, 2006-2011

Funding sources	2006 Survey (n=185) (%)	2011 Survey (n=312) (%)	Difference (5)
Grants and donations	91.6	75.0	-16.6
Earned income	6.0	21.2	+15.2
Government funding ¹¹	2.4	3.8	+1.4

Source: (Khieng, 2014, p. 1458)

Likewise various evidences elucidate that funding is decreasing among many local NGOs and some foreign NGOs. For instance, the USAID (2015) reports that Cambodian CSOs’ financial viability, which is a component of CSOs’ sustainability, declined in 2015 compared 2014. The agency details that CCC’s visits to a number of provincial networks shockingly revealed that approximately 65 percent of provincial CSOs have closed offices or reduced their activities (ibid). The author’s repeated interviews with various CSOs in Phnom Penh, Takeo, Kompot and Battambang in 2007, 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2017 confirmed the trend. It is common to hear an NGO leader complaining that “I worked through holidays and weekends till I got sick to secure

¹⁰ See appendix 03 for evolution of development paradigms and consequences on the role of NGOs.

¹¹ Government funding refers to the allocation of Cambodia’s national budget or ODA of multilateral and bilateral donors, which is spent through government ministries or sub-national government to NGOs. One obvious example is the Ministry of Education’s support for KAPE mentioned in this report,

funding for my NGO; however, we still face funding shortage and decline”¹² and that “NGOs these days compete for fund just like a crow of ants craving for a small piece of sugar”¹³. The situation worsens in 2017; for instance, an interviewed NGO leader said his NGO had to reduce employees from 300 to just 120 over the last few years¹⁴; another NGO leader said her NGO used to enjoy an annual budget of more than one million USD a year 10 years ago, but it might close in 2018 if it does not privatize the NGO and compromise social values it has adopted since its establishment¹⁵.

Khieng (2014) already claims that CSOs’ funding has declined about 17 per cent by 2014. However, the impact felt by CSOs is more dramatic. What explains the discrepancy between the amount of funding cut and the considerable effects on CSOs? What is the new trend of donors’ support to CSOs in Cambodia? Which types of NGOs have experienced severe funding drop, foreign NGOs, local NGOs, development NGOs, human rights and democracy NGOs?

Donors’ Atomizing and Prioritizing Strategies

Ostensibly the drop by 17 per cent of funding should translate into 17 per cent of CSOs dying or freezing activities. However, the data above shows that only less than 30 per cent of registered CSOs have survived and up to 65 per cent of provincial CSOs have been inactive. Further, an interviewed consultant who studied provincial CSOs in four provinces of Battambang, Kratie, Prey Veng, and Kompot found that only about 3 CSOs in each province are functioning rigorously out of the average 30 CSOs per province¹⁶. Three prominent reasons explain this trend. First, lately, a number of informants explained that many donors and foreign NGOs have started to fund fewer CSOs—continuing to support the most established CSOs and withdrawing support from the weak ones; DanChurchAid (DCA) is a case in point. Second, Sua´rez and Gugerty (2016)’s survey among 230 NGOs, local and international, in Cambodia maintains that foreign NGOs continue to have enjoyed more financial assistance from donor agencies than the local ones. Some informants confirm that many foreign NGOs have stable funding¹⁷. Third, several interviewees indicated that some donors have followed each other by transferring their funding from one regional location to another, and from one sector to another. For instance,

¹² Author’s personal interview with LNGO 13, Phnom Penh, December 27, 2012

¹³ Author’s personal interview with INGO 09, Phnom Penh, December 28, 2011

¹⁴ Authors’ personal interview with LNGO 03, Phnom Penh, June 23, 2017

¹⁵ Authors’ personal interview with LNGO 05, Phnom Penh, June 02, 2017

¹⁶ Authors’ personal interview with a consultant 02, Phnom Penh, August 10, 2017

¹⁷ Authors’ personal interview with INGO 06, Phnom Penh, August 16, 2017; Authors’ personal interview with LNGO 01, Phnom Penh, June 16, 2017; Authors’ personal interview with LNGO 07, Phnom Penh, August 03, 2017; Authors’ personal interview with LNGO 08, Phnom Penh, August 07, 2017; Authors’ personal interview with LNGO 12, Phnom Penh, August 09, 2017.

Oxfam Novib has started to support the northeast region of Cambodia consisting of six provinces. Hence they take money from NGOs operating in other provinces to those six provinces. Likewise, a few NGOs have re-strategized, orienting more support activities to indigenous people¹⁸. Furthermore, some bilateral agencies such as AusAid (now called Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade [DFAT]) while still supporting conventional areas such as agriculture, gender, disability, and health, has recently geared more support to private sector development¹⁹, suggesting DFAT's traditional commitment to NGOs has shrunk.

Consequences of Funding Drop Vary from one CSO to Another

The funding drop does not affect every NGO evenly, however, according to our interviews. Some foreign NGOs, especially the large and established ones tabled in appendix 02, have relatively resilient budget. For instance, Oxfam International secures 70% of core funding from individuals' donation, not only from developed countries but from emerging economies such as Hong Kong, mainland China, Indonesia, India, and Mexico; such funding is increasing as the size of the middle class in those developing nations is expanding²⁰. This organization counts on conventional donors' money for the other 30% of its budget only²¹. The funding situations of established foreign NGOs listed in appendix 02 are similar to that of Oxfam International – they rely on a strong core funding composition and less on short term project based funding. Funding of such foreign NGOs as Diakonia, Forum Syd, Global Fund, Louvain Cooperation, HEKS, DCA, and bilateral agencies such as Sida and EU remain robust. However, other foreign NGOs including NDI, Conservation International, and International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), and such a bilateral agency as USAID have decreasing funding.

While many local NGOs have closed offices or frozen activities, a few types of local NGOs have secured their funding. For instance, very established network NGOs such as Cooperation Committee for Cambodia (CCC) and NGO Forum on Cambodia are healthy financially²². Likewise, an empirical check with such an organization like Ponleu Ney Kdey Sangkhum (PNKS) illuminates that its funding remains robust²³; budget of NGO Education Partnership of Cambodia (NEP), networks on education, and Kampuchean Action for Primary Education

¹⁸ Authors' personal interview with LNGO 11, Phnom Penh, August 07, 2017

¹⁹ Authors' personal interview with a former staff of donor 04, Phnom Penh, August 18, 2017

²⁰ Author's personal interview with INGO 01, Phnom Penh, May 25, 2017

²¹ Author's personal interview with INGO 01, Phnom Penh, May 25, 2017

²² Author's personal interview with LNGO 01, Phnom Penh, June 16, 2017; Author's personal interview with LNGO 02, Phnom Penh, June 01, 2017.

²³ Authors' personal interview with LNGO 06, Phnom Penh, May 22,

(KAPE) stay strong²⁴. Until recently funding had been neither a big issue for other recognized local NGOs that promote democracy and human rights. Obviously our interviews elucidated that donors have generally stabilized, if not increased, funding for some NGOs, especially those that are tough with the government, which promote human rights, democracy, and good governance. Nevertheless, the very latest attacks on the US funded National Democratic Institute (NDI) that had remarkably supported human rights and democracy NGOs, and the Cambodian government's poorer relationship with the US government means funding for democracy and human rights organizations are unlikely to remain stable. At the same time, it appears that some NGOs that support health sectors and general local development are the targets of funding cuts²⁵, for instance, KHANA has experienced some financial weakening²⁶; MEDiCAM has closed its office; Life with Dignity has a shortage of fund; Cambodian Development Mission for Disability (CDMD) is running out of funding; Women's Media Center of Cambodia may stop its media broadcasting program in the near future; and while some NGOs working on education enjoy stable finance, such a NGO as Krousar Yoeung has seen budget drop by nearly half recently²⁷.

As CSOs' fund is dwindling unevenly, to what degree has CSOs prepared to sustain their funding and consequently their operations? In what ways have CSOs strategized to sustain themselves? What types of NGOs could sustain? What costs (goals displacement, mission drift, value compromise...) have those CSOs experienced? As CSOs have transformed, are they still able to influenced policies? The next section will answer those questions.

III. CSOS' CAPACITY FOR FUND RAISING, RESOURCE MOBILIZATION, AND SUSTAINABILITY

CSOs' Capacity: An Overview

Capacity in this study refers to 'a set of attributes that help or enable an organization to fulfil its missions' (Eisinger, 2002, p. 117). While many characteristics are captured into NGOs' capacity, this report covers funding, NGOs' staff's education, NGOs' level of formalization and

²⁴ Authors' personal interview with a consultant 02, Phnom Penh, August 10, 2017; Authors' personal interview with LNGO 07, Phnom Penh, August 03, 2017.

²⁵ Author's personal interview with LNGO 04, Phnom Penh, June 20, 2017; Author's personal interview with LNGO 07, Phnom Penh, July 14, 2017; Author's personal interview with LNGO 08, Phnom Penh, July 14, 2017; Author's personal interview with LNGO 06, Phnom Penh, May 22, 2017

²⁶ Presentation by KHANA's representative at CCC's bimonthly meeting, Phnom Penh, August 03, 2017.

²⁷ Authors' personal interview with LNGO 05, Phnom Penh, June 02, 2017; Authors' personal interview with LNGO 09, Phnom Penh, August 07, 2017.

rationalization. Overall since the early 1990s, foreign NGOs' capacity is higher than local ones', even though over time local NGOs' capability has grown. Table 04 below demonstrates that more than half of all the NGOs (312, of which 223 are local NGOs) surveyed run on an average annual budget of US\$300,000 or less, with the highest percentage of NGOs (26 per cent) in the group of US\$10,001-100,000 (Khieng, 2014). Comparatively, 23 per cent of foreign NGOs have an annual budget of at least 1 million US dollars; however, only 6 per cent of local NGOs have that similar financial capacity. At the same time, while 49 per cent of foreign NGOs have the annual budget from USD500,001 up, only 23 per cent of local NGOs do.

Table 04: Average annual budget of LNGOs and Foreign NGOs (USD)

Average Annual Budget	Percentage		
	LNGOs	Foreign NGOs	Total
≤10,000	12	1	9
10,001-100,000	31	15	26
100,001-200,000	12	20	14
200,001-300,000	10	7	10
300,001-400,000	6	2	5
400,001-500,000	5	7	6
500,001-1,000,000	9	13	10
1,000,001-over	6	23	11
N/A	8	13	9
Total	100	100	100

Source: (Khieng, 2014, p. 1453).

In a study that maps capacity of 114 foreign NGOs and local NGOs in Cambodia, INGO leaders tend to have post graduate degree, with only 5 per cent of INGO leader did not attend college, compared 27 per cent for local NGO leaders (Sua´rez & Marshall, 2014). INGO leaders also had more business experiences than local counterparts. In addition, while almost all NGOs had board of directors, local NGOs is less 5 points compared to their foreign NGOs counterparts (93 per cent of foreign NGOs have board compared with 88 per cent for local NGOs) (ibid). An important difference is foreign NGOs’ boards have more members and meet more frequently, suggesting weaker local NGOs-board linkages than INGO-board ties (ibid).

Formalization means basic activities that separate NGOs from more informal civil society organizations, and rationalization refers the extent to which NGOs adopt and embrace management practices (ibid); formalization and rationalization combined are referred to as managerialism. At least 85 per cent of all NGOs publish a manual of standard operating procedures, develop a mission statement, write grant proposals, and annual reports. However, where 87 per cent of local NGOs produce annual budget, 97 per cent of foreign NGOs do (ibid). Regarding rationalization, when it comes to conducting program evaluations and identification of community needs, fewer local NGOs (25 per cent) than foreign NGOs use those techniques (ibid).

The 114 sampled NGOs’ capacity is broken using the following typology of networkers, translators, aspirants and laggards (Sua´rez & Marshall, 2014).

- a. **Networkers**, comprising of 14 NGOs (**10 per cent** of the 114), represent one of the two groups with high capacity. This group is dominated by local NGOs with the most resources of at least USD 500,000/year and adopt ‘best practices’ of NGO management. Such best management includes production of annual reports and strategic planning and commission of independent audits. What distinguishes this group from translators, another capable group, is that networkers develop more extensive networking with other NGOs and the government. In addition, they are able to obtain foreign government funding, lobby and advocate on behalf of communities.
- b. **Translators** are the second group with high capacity. 42 NGOs, constituting 36.8 per cent of the 114 NGOs (70 per cent are international and 30 per cent local) are translators. foreign NGOs as translators in this group act as translators between global and local contexts. Further this group is active in training government officials, meaning they play a crucial role in building and transferring capacity for government employees. Further local NGOs in this group constantly monitor and evaluate their work, indicating that ideas and management

practices of foreign NGOs (that support those local NGOs) spread well to those local groups. This group's average annual budget size is USD 500,000. They develop similar level of professionalization and rationalization - being vigorous (at least 90 per cent of NGOs in this category) in producing strategic development plans and annual reports and updating their websites. They differ from networkers in that translators set up less connections with other NGOs and stakeholders than networkers. Contrasting with the two groups with less capacity, translators are more professionalized NGOs.

- c. **Aspirants**, comprising 39 NGOs (34.2 per cent of the 114 NGOs) (mostly local), are substantially lower than networkers and translators in adopting standard management practices. They possess mid-range professionalization and rationalization, for instance, 90 per cent of aspirants have governing boards and write annual reports; however, less than 80 per cent of NGOs in this cluster develops mission statement and strategic plan. Aspirants are less likely than networkers and translators in commissioning independent audits and are less active in producing community needs assessments. Still this category are aware of management trends and monitor their finances as regularly as networkers. This group is smaller in size, compared with first two high capacity clusters and are based more in provinces than in Phnom Penh. Aspirants establish less networking compared with networkers and translators. Important to note is while translators develop less networking than networkers, they more active than aspirants in linking with other organizations.

- d. **Laggards**, consisting of 19 NGOs (16.6 per cent of 114), are comparable to aspirants in size, concentration in provinces, and age. However, the laggards lack behind aspirants in every capacity measurement. Leaders of this cluster have the least education and staff compared with the other three groups. Laggards attempt to professionalize, yet they lack resources to do it. Therefore, not surprisingly, this category of NGOs are unlikely to have websites, write regular annual reports, produce strategic plans, and have a clear mission statement. While laggards are not very newcomers in development work, having operated for 11 years on average, they are not very active in building networks. Only over 60 per cent of laggards belong to networks and they are the most isolated of all the clusters.

CSOs, Fund Raising, Resource Mobilization, and Sustainability

In this report, “*resource mobilization* is a process whereby resources both financial and non-financial resources are mobilized either externally or internally to support organization activities. *Fundraising* is the act of persuading people or organizations to raise money for a cause” (Batti, 2014, p. 57). Fund-raising is the activity of collecting money to support a charity or campaign or organization. Fundraising means funds are elsewhere and somebody has to explore and access the funds. Resource mobilization has additional two concepts; one is that non-financial resources are crucial and secondly some resources can be generated by the organization internally rather than sourced from others (ibid). NGOs’ capacity in relation to fund raising, resource mobilization and sustainability could be classified below.

1. **Capable NGOs Survive:** Sua´rez and Marshall (2014) reveal above that not more than 10 per cent of local NGOs could be categorized as networkers that have two potential capacities – strong internal managerialism and networking. At the same time only 30 per cent of local NGOs are considered translators which possess a high capacity but lack networks (ibid). Professionalism and networking are key to raising, mobilizing fund, and even *diversifying* income sources. The trend is supported by the majority of our interviews; it is apparent that for an NGO to maintain funding support, it requires key leadership staff to have not only strong technical skills but more importantly highly effective management and networking capacity²⁸. Our respondents from CCC, NGO Forum on Cambodia, PNKS, NEP, KHANA, KAPE, another human rights NGO (requesting anonymity), and almost every established INGO possess such capacity. Likewise, another study by David Sua´rez and Mary Kay Gugerty who studied original data from Cambodia found “evidence to suggest that donor countries privilege managerial NGOs; rationalized, professionalized are more likely to receive bilateral donor funding” (Sua´rez & Gugerty, 2016, p. 2633). Up to 70 per cent of foreign NGOs are classified as translators; that is why more foreign NGOs than local NGOs are able to retain funding support from donors (Sua´rez & Marshall, 2014).
2. **Weak and Irrelevant NGOs Die:** The explanation goes that some of the aspirants and laggards are most prone to dying. They have inadequate managerialism and networks to keep the diminishing fund. In addition, our respondents described that some NGOs conducting such activities as legal aid, disability, decentralization, and community welfare and development that are unable to generate revenues from commercializing

²⁸ Authors’ personal interview with a consultant 03, Phnom Penh, August 08, 2017

activities face financial downturn, crisis, and closure. That happened even though they have a reasonably high capacity; Cambodia Defender Project is a case in point.

3. **Adaptive NGOs move on:** There are some types of NGOs whose capacity may fall between networkers and translators. These NGOs have capacity and/or networks and are more ready to adapt to change - they are also active to find innovative ideas and develop flexibility responding to the changing development and political trends in Cambodia. The case of Aide et Action in Box 01 below illustrates how a strong NGO with high and effective entrepreneurial spirit has transformed the NGO to generate income and serve the poor simultaneously. However, not all types of this group can maneuver in the new funding atmosphere—NGOs who are working on technical aspects such as education, children, and livelihood are more likely to gain support from the government and therefore their legitimacy to find other funding sources including the government source than those NGOs who are working in the fields that deems politically sensitive or controversial. For the latter, again, managerialism which donors look for, are crucial for trust building with new and existing donors.

Box 01: Aide et Action: An Entrepreneurial NGO with a Strong Leadership

Aide et Action, an international organization, which is specialized in early childhood and child education has been successful in incorporating its entrepreneurial skills in order to expand their interventions in their target areas in Cambodia. There are at least two unique insights that we can learn from Aide et Action in this regards:

- (1) Entrepreneurial spirit of the leadership is necessary in terms of looking for new opportunities in order to general funding while pursuing their mandate. AEA has a clear idea of strengthening quality education for infants and kids in the country. As market is open in the capital city of Phnom Penh, its leadership has decided to run a fee paying daycare and primary school to cater the growing middle class in the city. The aim is two-pronged: 1) sharing resource of this center for their target programs across the countryside in the country (up to 20 per cent of their staff time, for example, is to be spent on community centers in rural ears); and 2) earmarking any fee paid a kid in the city for the sustainability of their projects in the rural areas. Given growing support by families in the city, the school is likely to make profits in the near future and therefore AEA can expand their intervention in the countryside.
- (2) Low-cost local human resources are a valuable resources to be taped for both sustainability and cost-effective purposes. AEA is ready to transfer their skills in quality education to local human resources so that the latter can contribute to improving quality education in their communities. Working closely with retired teachers, local people, and local authority to run and manage community centers is ensuring for both sustainability and cost recovering objectives.

4. **Social Enterprises: A Narrow but Emerging Option:** With the waning funding scenario, is social enterprise an appropriate choice; if so, for whom?

Khieng and Dahles (2015, p. 222) define social enterprises and related concepts this way. “*Social enterprises*: Organizations which pursue social missions or purposes that operate to create community benefit regardless of ownership or legal structure and with varying degrees of financial self-sufficiency, innovation and social transformation.

Social entrepreneurs: Individuals who with their entrepreneurial spirit and personality will act as change agents and leaders to tackle social problems by recognizing new opportunities and finding innovative solutions, and are more concerned with creating social value than financial value.

Social entrepreneurship: A concept which represents a variety of activities and processes to create and sustain social value by using more entrepreneurial and innovative approaches and constrained by the external environment”.

Out of 312 NGOs that Khieng and Dahles (2015) surveyed, 43, accounting for almost 14 per cent generated incomes from commercial activities. The majority of them engaged in tourism and hospitality, education and vocational training, and agriculture and fishery (ibid). The study offers a mixed picture of more positive effects than drawbacks of commercialization in the NGO sector that seeks to balance between mission and market. First of all, at the organization level, NGOs have experienced improved governance, a strengthened financial and administration system, enhanced efficiency, and more autonomy and independence. Second, at the community tier, various benefits mount up to communities, comprising better services, vocational and technical training, and income generation and employment. Third, at the national layer, there emerges a potential change of the development paradigm and social change. The funding sources generated locally meant emancipating from foreign domination to local ownership. Overall, social entrepreneurship leads to the mushrooming of a variety of grass-root organizations comprising self-help groups, community enterprises, micro and small businesses, socially responsible businesses social enterprises, cooperatives, farmer associations, women associations, and saving groups (ibid).

However, unavoidably, a few drawbacks are noticeable. First, there is imbalance between commercialized NGOs’ mission of promoting social aims and market, which are two contrasting forces. For instance, some commercialized NGOs have excluded or sidelined intended beneficiaries (ibid). Second, NGOs we interviewed share an understanding and

concern that ‘social enterprise’ is not for everyone, and everyone is not for social enterprise. It is not for everyone because to run social enterprise one needs to start to think like a ‘businessman’/ ‘social entrepreneur’²⁹. Some informants demonstrate they have such capacity³⁰; however, many including executive directors of NGOs and NGOs’ board of directors severely lack such entrepreneurial skills and are unwilling to learn and adopt business model³¹. Third, various informants are concerned that successful social businesses such as Hagar, PSE, Friends International and various farmer cooperatives such as those in Tram Kak whose capital ranges from USD 20,000 to USD 600,000 are unable influence government policies for the sake of the betterment of the society³². That is because they are occupied with the demanding business approach, therefore, lack commitment, time, and efforts to advocate for policy change. At the same time, only around 14% of NGOs could take commercial turn (Khieng & Dahles, 2015), that means various NGOs, especially those doing advocacy work, promoting human rights, and democracy do not fit this category. Fourth, social enterprises have to compete fiercely with private enterprises that operate freely to for personal gains. Without special protection from the state and donors’ support, it remains doubtful how far social enterprises will survive without seriously compromising its social values, goals, and mission. Finally, there are serious concerns that the commercial turn of NGOs into microfinance institutions or banks no longer help but *harm* the poor and marginalized groups³³.

Based on the aforementioned discussions what are the implications for a feasible functionality of the CSF? That is the task of the next section.

²⁹ The following questions are relevant: what will be your products, what will be your market, will be there a market, who are your competitors, and what are the risks and what is your start-up capital? So on and so forth. Thinking like a ‘businessman’ is seen as very challenging for many not-for-profit leaders. The first question of what is your product is mainly related to the main activities of an organizations, and their expertise, be it education, agricultural products, or a service in ICT. And the following questions will need to be adequately discussed and studied. The last question of start-up capital is another challenging question to address. Moreover, the paradox between NGO’s not-for-profit mandate and profit-maximizing business also comes into play. Some people see business model for not-for-profit organization has unfit for their commitment to social benefit and public interest.

³⁰ Authors’ personal interview with LINGO 06, Phnom Penh, August 16, 2017; Authors’ personal interview with LINGO 06, Phnom Penh, May 22, 2017; Authors’ personal interview with LINGO 07, Phnom Penh, August 03, 2017; Authors’ personal interview with LINGO 12, Phnom Penh, August 09, 2017

³¹ Authors’ personal interview with LINGO 05, Phnom Penh, June 02, 2017; Authors’ personal interview with a consultant 03, Phnom Penh, August 08, 2017

³² Authors’ personal interview with a consultant 02, Phnom Penh, August 10, 2017; Authors’ personal interview with a consultant 03, Phnom Penh, August 08, 2017

³³ Authors’ personal interview with LINGO 11, Phnom Penh, August 07, 2017

IV. FUNCTIONALITY AND OPERATIONALIZATION OF CSF

As funding for CSOs in Cambodia has shrunk yet the impetus and roles of CSOs remain robust, it is high time for a CSF initiative to take shape. Based on consultation with different related literature, various field visits to different provinces, and forty interviews among donors, foreign NGOs, business individuals, consultants, social entrepreneurs, and government officials, the research offers the following analyses, ideas, and options.

What is CSF?

Experiences elsewhere: An extensive Google search has found some existing *local* funding agencies/foundations, especially those operating in Africa. However there is nothing similar to the CSF that is under discussion. In Myanmar, Local Resource Centre (LRC) (<https://www.lrcmyanmar.org/en/about-lrc>) emerged in 2008 and registered as a local NGO in 2012. LRC functions more like CCC in Cambodia where it coordinates NGOs in Myanmar to do advocacy work, empowers and trains civil society organizations, promotes democratic development, and produces database on NGOs in the country. However, LRC neither raises fund nor mobilize local and external resources to sustain local civil society organizations; nor does it initiate any investment for sustainability. In short, LRC functions as a conventional NGO, receiving support from donors and conducts traditional NGO activities; it does not display an explicit task as a local funding agency that funds local civil society groups either. Similarly, The Foundation for Civil Society in Tanzania (<http://www.thefoundation.or.tz/index.php/en/aboutus/history>) receives support from Western donors and serves as local funding agency, giving hundreds of small and medium grants to local civil society organizations in Tanzania. However, the foundation does not mobilize local resources for sustainability. The Independent Development Fund (IDF) (<http://idf.co.ug/about-us/>) in Uganda runs in similar ways to the foundation in Tanzania. There are various foundations in Africa what are associated with particular individuals who use personal wealth to set up charity or foundations or are connected to private companies such Ford, Johnson and Johnson. These later foundations function as Corporate Social Responsibility arms of those corporations.

CSF in Cambodia, a unique and distinct type of civil society fund, is a forum initiated by CCC and will be managed by a committee housed at CCC's office. At this stage the European Union and Bread for the World ³⁴ have provided \$150,000 of seedling fund for CSF. The overall aim of

³⁴ Under the project of "Strengthening Civil Society for Democratic and Sustainable Development in Cambodia".

CSF is to mobilize fund within Cambodia and beyond to sustain CSOs and their operations in Cambodia. Initial ideas of CSF include:

- 1) serving as a Cambodian center which mobilizes, raises, and manage fund, as well as develops capacity for local CSO financial sustainability,
- 2) providing grants to some local NGOs that deserve support or some emergency activities falling out of the scope of current donors and various foreign NGOs, and providing sponsorship to multi-stakeholder initiative/projects for development where relevant,
- 3) empowering the local Cambodian (the rich, individuals, and the private sector) to pool fund for CSOs' operations, and
- 4) offering concessional loans to, say, Community Based Ecotourism so that CSF can endure and expand in the long run.

CSF in Cambodia could function more than the Tanzanian counterpart by mobilizing resources from external and local donors and distribute to local NGOs; that is because there is growing societal energy in contributing to social causes. Success of fund raising activities have emerged in various parts of Asia and Cambodia's neighbors such as Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia, India and others. Kuntheak Bopha's hospital, for instance, raises from USD 10,000 to USD 15,000 per month in 2017³⁵; about 10 years ago local Cambodians contributed almost nothing this medical foundation. Kuntheak Bopha's story tells that it requires time, patience, efforts, and commitment to raise awareness among local potential donors. The same thing goes to CSF's social investment; the aforementioned sections provide that some social enterprises have fared well in Cambodia over the past 10 years or so. Lessons from those enterprises would contribute to CSF's growth.

Initial steps for the first three years: To begin, CSF should operate as a non-profit forum, primarily aiming to achieve the first three objectives by mobilizing funds internal and external of Cambodia and distributing grants to potential NGOs and CBOs. That is because it is easier to provide grants than to invest for sustainability. At the same time, during the first few years, CSF secretariat will be occupied with a lot of communication and lobbying work with potential donors, supporting individuals, and institutions. Therefore, it is best to have a small but firm start. Out of the USD150, 000, three *piloting* grants of \$30,000 should be given three different local NGOs on a three-year basis. This long term commitment will allow the grantees to have time for producing tangible outcomes and building capacity. The other \$60,000 should be left for the next cycle, following the first three years. Small development NGOs/CBOs that run welfare and community development activities using right-based approaches and have established good reputation yet whose donors have withdrawn funding should be the targets of CSF's first three

³⁵ Authors' visit to a Kuntheak Bopha branch in Phnom Penh, July 10, 2017.

years' support. These organizations reduce poverty and embed advocacy with their development projects, that means they promote community welfare and simultaneously advocate for farmers' rights softly in trusted relationships with local governments (Ou, 2013, 2015). Such organizations with the mentioned approaches would work in Cambodia now because overt *confrontational advocacy approaches are less tolerated* by the contemporary regime. Another major task in the first several years for CSF is to kick start with a clear strategic plan to raise awareness among commoners, the middle class, the rich, Cambodian diaspora, and the Buddhist pagodas and their (pagoda) associations about the crucial roles of unconventional approaches to helping the poor, marginalized groups, and achieving other socio-economic development and even environmental goals via CSOs.

Besides, the key staff of CSF need to engage with mapping, accessing, and identifying potential resources and related information, build and upgrade capacities on fund raising, fund mobilization, and financial sustainability, and strengthen and refresh networks among potential local and international donors.

Beyond the first three years. Following a few years of operations and accumulation of experiences, CSF may slowly invest to generate profits to serve its sustainability and social goals. CSF may start with supporting Community-Based Eco Tourism (CBET) by co-investing with or providing those communities concessional loans. Since the early 1990s, CBET has been set up in Cambodia to raise income for community members and conserve natural resources (Rith, Williams, & Neth, 2009; Ven, 2016). In early 2000s, there were a few CBETs; however, it increased quickly to approximately 30³⁶ in 2008 (ibid). Insofar, CBETs have produced more evidences of successes than challenges. For instance, a case study of Yeak Loam (Ratanakiri) and Chambok (Kampong Speu) illustrates that CBET has become a useful tool for conservation and considerable income generation for overall community development (Rith et al., 2009). There is also clear evidence of decreasing illegal logging and hunting activities together with the emergence of mechanisms to cope with environmental problems (ibid). The same way, Seyha Ven (2016) found that in Yeak Loam community, the majority of members have developed positive attitude toward the initiative, namely Absolute Supporter (69%), and Beneficiary Supporter (14%). Evidences from Kep's Prek Trapaeng Community Fisheries (PTCF) confirm the above analysis. In around 2000, there were barely any mangrove trees. PTCF was then set up around 2003 from when community members and tourists have planted mangrove. By 2017 several dozens of hectares of mangroves have emerged for tourists, more fish and crabs are

³⁶ See, Appendix 03 for List of CBET projects in Cambodia as of 2008

available for the local community members. With the emergence of these resources, the CBET of Prek Trapaeng has flourished, attracting many tourists, especially foreign tourists who often stay overnight at the guesthouses of the community.

The community of Torteng Tha Ngai (ទីភ្នំថៃ) (located in Beoung Touk Commune, Chhouk

“Manage Your Grant Training (MYG) is a mandatory training for all new grantees of the Foundation”

Table 04: Capacity development and Training

Grant Management Training. Manage Your Grant Training (MYG) is a mandatory training for all new grantees of the Foundation. The training is designed to ensure enhanced CSOs capacity to manage project implementation, grant, as well as tracking and reporting of results and outcomes of projects to be implemented. It also exposes the grantees to contractual obligations with regard to the project implementation and management of funds.

Tailor-Made Trainings and Peer learning sessions. These are need-based customized trainings to CSO geared to enhance organizational systems and procedures, managerial and governance as well as technical capacities of CSOs so that they can effectively engage in change processes. Tailor-made training are used to address capacity gaps emerging from training needs assessment, support/monitoring visits. Support Organization development processes. Under this activity FCS supports CSOs in organizational development processes such as strategic planning and formulation of governance policies and guidelines.

Organizational Capacity Assessment. Organization Capacity Assessment is the intervention that facilitates CSOs to be consciously aware of Organizational Strengths and Weaknesses. The processes enable CSOs to identify capacity gaps and work on areas that need immediate improvement through various capacity building interventions like coaching, mentoring, and provision of technical backstopping.

Providing technical backstopping to CSOs receiving funds from FCS through support visits. One of the main ways of ensuring that grantees supported by the Foundation achieve their expected outcomes is through providing them with technical backstopping. This backstopping can be provided through support visits, emails, letters, phone calls, SMS, and face-to-face discussions. Source:

<http://www.thefoundation.or.tz/index.php/en/our-services/capacity-building>

District, Kompot), for instance, has a great potential to become a popular CBET. Nevertheless, insofar it has not yet been supported by any major donors – CSF could jump in. Torteng Tha Ngai is close to Bokor National Park and it has a large piece of 400 hectare land that is suitable for mangrove plantation. Now the existing community has planted 250 mangrove trees; however, more plantation requires more financial support. A CCC’s member called Building

Community Voice (BCV) has mobilized farmers to set up a crab bank and CBET, and a \$4000 building was constructed; yet the idea of CBET gets stuck because BCV has limited resources.

Other services and coverage of CSF: Besides doing a long term awareness raising activity, providing grants local civil society groups, do fundraising work, and investing to financially sustain civil society activities, CSF might need to jump in to support grantees or investees. Table 04 above lists some experiences of the Foundation for Civil Society in Tanzania, which could be highly relevant to Cambodia's CSF. In addition, CSF will provide coaching and training on grant proposal writing to grantees so that they are able to mobilize and diversify funding sources themselves. Other training may include networking skills, which will allow grantees to build connection with and trust of donors who may provide future grants to these CSOs. Finally, CSF could be a hub whereby local CSOs encountering various problems could come for counseling and advice.

CSF committee may comprise six members: a coordinator (to be recruited), one representative from CCC, one CCC's member, one donor representative, one representative from the private sector³⁷, and a capable abbot from a Buddhist pagoda. CSF that involves representatives from these domains creates an experimenting opportunity for CSF to lobby diverse relevant groups, from some of which funding could be extracted. As of incentives, the coordinator needs to run CSF on the full time basis, accordingly the position requires an appropriate salary package. Honorarium could be offered to the other five members who may meet every four months or so. Beyond honorarium, the five members need to be established individuals who really buy into the idea of CSF and its impact – they clearly see the reasons for their contributions.

The roles and responsibilities of CSF Committee:

1. Supporting CSF coordinator in providing ideas and direction for CSF. They can assist, for instance, in validating proposals (first three years' grant making, social investment from the fourth year, and capacity development plans) put forth in this report and raising other potential initiatives for CSF to further develop itself. The private sector member could specifically offer recommendations on how CSF could innovatively adopt, for

³⁷ A few private individuals including the president of CEO Master, president of Cambodian Investment Club, and the owner of Campaint. The Executive Director of Women's Media Center of Cambodia also has an extensive networks with business and rich people. Snowball meetings these few people could pave the way for further engagement with a wider web of potential business individuals, a few of which could be recruited to contribute to CSF's work. It should be noted that even a full hour meeting, not permanent participation, between CSF's coordinator and a potential business person would generate useful inputs for CSF in the founding phase.

instance, a business style of management of some sort to sustain and expand CSF's operations.

2. Occasionally joining the CSF coordinator at the early phase of lobbying varied potential donors to pool resources for CSF.
3. Promoting CSF, its mission and vision widely, especially among donor community, the private sector, and potential donors/individuals who make donation to pagodas. The concerned members could help connect CSF coordinator with a wide range of potential funding sources to be extracted from.
4. Attending regular quarterly meetings and engage in discussion of issues of concerns to CSF.
5. Providing advice on specific activities CSF should execute for the interest of CSF.

Roles and responsibilities of CSF coordinator:

1. Engaging with scholars, researchers, consultants, prominent staff of donors, INGOs, like minded government officials and the like to mobilize their ideas and support for an effective CSF establishment.
2. Building and strengthen networks with potential donors in Cambodia and beyond. Donors include traditional Western donors (embassies, UN agencies, foundations, INGOs...), emerging ones such as China Foundation³⁸, Cambodian diaspora, and local (rich) individuals.
3. Engaging with Cambodia's Ministry of Economy and Finance and Ministry of Interior for possible opportunities to obtain fund for local CSOs.
4. Lobbying various groups above to pull fund for CSF.
5. Searching for and inviting highly capable and relevant individuals to join CSF committee
6. Coordinating with CSF committee members to seek their advice, guidance, and direction.
7. Lobbying CSF committee members to promote the name and activities of CSF.
8. Consulting with CCC and CSF committee to identify small grantees.
9. Looking for opportunities to get training for him/herself and a few temporary CCC staff who involve in the work of CSF. Training include fund raising, mobilization, management, grant provision, and social investment for sustainability.
10. Monitoring and evaluating grants and social investment.
11. Compiling reports of CSF activities and proposing topics or ideas for discussion at the CSF Committee meeting whenever necessary.

³⁸ There is some information that China Foundation has planned to support NGOs in Cambodia. The CSF coordinator could contact NGO Forum, the Chinese Embassy, and others that might have their contact.

12. Providing leadership managing day-to-day works of CSF, working closely with all the staffs designated as CSF staff.
13. Producing (annual) reports for donors
14. Engaging in recruiting future staff for CSF secretariat

The coordinator is supposed to perform a lot work in the first six months or even a year in identifying and lobbying the like-minded individuals, different NGOs, institutions, and companies to move the initiative forward. Lessons from the Foundation for Civil Society in Tanzania³⁹ reveal that before the foundation was established, a capable visionary leader had energetically collaborated and consulted with 14 organizations, 5 independent consultants, and 50 other people from different institutions and professions. It was the synergy of all these efforts that gave birth to the foundation in 2003, when it mobilized USD 1.5 million and their budget reached USD **10 million** in 2014 (FFC, 2004, 2014). Here it implies that a lot of efforts await CSF in Cambodia. Again, CCC and its to-be-recruited coordinator of CSF are supposed to follow the footsteps of the Foundation for Civil Society in Tanzania in mobilizing ideas and support from CCC's members (foreign NGOs and local NGOs), like-minded researchers and consultants (such as those from CCC's Research Advisory Board Members), successful business individuals, some senior government officials, and donors. If possible, the coordinator should do a field visit to the Foundation for Civil Society in Tanzania, accessing first-hand experiences of the foundation and judging what works and does not work for CSF in Cambodia. A number of staff of Foundation for Civil Society in Tanzania in the early years were visiting grant making institutions in the United Kingdom and other places as well to gain experiences for the job back home (FFC, 2004).

Factors leading to success: Until now, because there is not an existing foundation that is akin to CSF, documentation about the success and failure of such organizations and what works and what does not is not available. However, several related lessons from the Foundation for Civil Society in Tanzania are useful and should be considered. First, there is a highly capable founding leader who is immensely knowledgeable about Western democracy and East African and Tanzanian politics and societies, possesses strong communication and networking skills, and has strong work ethics and performance standards (FFC, 2004). The founder serves as bridge between the West and East African societies, mobilizing a significant amount of support for the foundation since its start in 2003 (ibid). Second it appears that the foundation and its leadership were able to maintain considerable support from various prominent agencies such as SDC, DFID, and The Royal Netherlands Embassy (RNE) which were among key founders of the foundation (ibid). Further the Department of Cooperation Ireland (DCI), Royal Norwegian

³⁹ See their annual reports for more details, <http://www.thefoundation.or.tz/index.php/en/reports-publications>.

Embassy, and Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), among others, have financially supported the foundation (ibid). Third, the Foundation for Civil Society in Tanzania identifies itself as an *investor* of social change. That means, contrary to conventional grant agencies that provide fund to grantees and often wait for reports, punishing poor performance and incentivizing good performance, the foundation shares risks with *investees* and work together to accomplish the grant goals and success (ibid). Important to note as well, while traditional donors *only* give funds to grantees that have capacity to meet the technical standards of the donors, the foundation takes notice of the lack of eligibility (lack of capacity) of investees and nurtures those organizations on a long term basis (ibid).

CSF's legality: With the Cambodian government tightening space for NGOs' operation, it is reasonable for CSF to stay embedded with CCC so that CSF neither requires a separate registration with the Ministry of Interior nor is prone to different government tax requirements. In fact, even in the long run when CSF could have the potential to become a large organization like the Foundation for Civil Society in Tanzania, CSF may remain an immense component of CCC. That is because CSF shares similar mission and vision of CCC, for instance, those of the Governance Hub Program of CCC⁴⁰. In short, establishing a separate entity of CSF would overlap the roles of CCC, which is against CCC's goals of cutting transaction costs among CSOs in Cambodia and reducing duplication of CSOs' work. By the same token, at its young age, CSF is advised to make use of the existing Board of Directors of CCC. More to point, it is CSF establishment and moving forward the idea, which are the top priorities now, not BOD issues.

The justification for the emergence of CSF. **First** and most importantly, CSF could fill the gap left by foreign NGOs and donors. Donors and foreign NGOs in Cambodia have begun to support less local NGOs, change their strategies by leaving NGOs in some provinces behind, support more of democracy and human rights NGOs than development oriented ones, and shift the focus to supporting more of private sector development than NGOs generally. Such a drastic change inevitably causes some local NGOs, including those with good credit and capacity, to collapse. That is the space that CSF could fill by saving lives of those deserving. The experiences of the Foundation for Civil Society in Tanzania illustrate that the local foundation has responded well to the local demands. CSF in Cambodia may equip with similar potential.

Second, there is increasing acceptance among foreign NGOs that local NGOs have developed stronger capacity and networks regionally and internationally and that local NGOs have greater

⁴⁰ Governance Hub's Program's mission is "Provide high quality services to civil society and influence Cambodia's development actors and its goal is "A strong and capable civil society, cooperating and responsive to Cambodia's development challenges".

potential than foreign NGOs in supporting CBOs or grassroots initiatives (Oxfam, 2014). Oxfam highlighted "... the need for INGO to challenge themselves to step back and support strong, accountable civil society organizations (CSO) if they are to facilitate a civil society characterized by resilient communities and a responsive government" (Oxfam, 2014, p. iii). With such a shared understanding, it is high time donors nurtured CSF by channeling direct funding to this institution to strengthen local civil society in Cambodia.

Third, the aforementioned discussion explains that funding for CSOs that provide services has declined. That stimulates the emergence CSF that is able to generate sustained local fund to compensate for the diminishing resources for service delivery CSOs. CSF is the first initiative of its kind that will mobilize local untapped resources comprising the individuals, the rich (Okhna...), the middle class, private sector, and Cambodian diaspora. Based on experiences of Oxfam International, among other foreign NGOs, these resources could be tapped sustainably for CSO's operations - Oxfam International's contemporary funding is mobilized more from individuals than from traditional donors' organizations. Inherently money generated from such local sources allow CSOs to hold more autonomy for themselves unlike when they spend foreign money which holds local CSOs more accountable to the donors than the beneficiaries. An informant who has worked extensively in Asia, Africa and beyond noted that local fund raising has worked among various developing countries such as India, Mexico, Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, and Vietnam⁴¹ (Menon, 2016). Indian donors, for instance, in just two years grew from 3,000 donors in 2008 to 50,000 donors in 2010 and contributed more than \$11 million in 2010 (Yuen, 2010).

Fourth, varied international development agendas such SDGs and the related Third International Conference on Financing for Development in Addis Ababa highlighted the contributions of local actors including civil society organizations and effective use of ODA respectively. Clearly, SDGs operate with multi -stakeholder decision making involving private sector, community, local government, various civil society organizations (Geoghegan, 2013). At the same time, one action plan in the International Conference on Financing for Development states that "...We [all states participating to achieve SDGs] encourage partner countries to build on progress achieved in ensuring that ODA is used effectively to help to achieve development goals and targets" (UN, 2015, p. 18). All development trends mean donors are supposed to nurture local civil society to have capacity that is adequate in working together with other development actors to attain SDGs. In sum, CSF is an excellent platform through which donors are able to strengthen local civil society in Cambodia.

⁴¹ Authors' personal interview with INGO 01, Phnom Penh, May 25, 2017

Fifth, with dwindling funding for CSOs, reduction of transaction costs during the disbursement process is advocated. These days, funding from Brussels, for example, flows through many layers, from the head office of donors, sometimes through bilateral development agencies, in most cases through various foreign NGOs, before it finally reaches down to local CSOs. If fund is transferred directly from Brussels to CSF committee, it would cut down many costs and reporting requirements. Likewise, as donors are saving costs, they start to fund consortium of NGOs more than individuals NGOs. CSF could be an excellent model/consortium to absorb and distribute fund.

Finally, CCC, a top notched and most established membership CSO in Cambodia, has gained a strong record of good practice and governance; its NGO Governance & Professional Practice (GPP) is widely recognized in Cambodia and Southeast Asia. As a result the extended arm of CCC's CSF would inherit a long legacy of governance and effective support for civil society coordination and building.

CSF and Opportunities

A potential opportunity for CSF is following the first three years of establishment, CSF will demonstrate to donors and various stakeholders that grants provided to the intended NGOs as beneficiaries will be effectively spent, contributing to building civil society's health and development in Cambodia broadly. Worth emphasizing is Western donors will buy into the notion of CSF and begin transferring funds directly from their head office to CSF. As well in the first three years, CSF will gradually build rapport among some rich individuals (through the abbot and his peers), middle class groups, potential donors, and the private sector. In addition, CSF will have opportunities to slowly empower those four groups from whom some fund could be extracted to building CSF.

CSF will represent a potential avenue to establishing partnership between CSOs and private sector in Cambodia. As the country is developing and private sector is growing, private resource is also growing and has been used for social development activities in an *isolated*, and *uncoordinated* way. Businesses have been engaged in such social development activities as donating books, bicycles, study materials, helmet, clothing, scholarship and school construction. These activities are implemented by different businesses, usually along with their club or business associations. This contribution is seen by business as part of their Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), and the growing trend might create a promising opportunity for CSOs, represented by CSF to build partnership for longer, more coordinated social development

intervention. More importantly, CSF, CCC and its members have profound potential in collaborating with and lobbying the Cambodian government to introduce a law requiring private companies to pay a small percentage of their profits to CSR, say, 1 percent, which could be used by CSF and Cambodian civil society to promote Cambodian poor's welfare in a sustainable manner. India, for instance, passed a law in 2013, making it mandatory for companies to contribute 2 per cent of their profits to social causes (Menon, 2013).

When CSF is more developed, it could serve as a forum to coordinate between local fundees and funders. A recent study by Kristen Roggemann (2016, p. 7) asserts that "Half of the donors/development partners interviewed said that personal relationships and NGO brand were their first screen on finding projects to fund, and the majority did not have any sort of public call to source proposals. Strategically attending events and getting to know donors/development partners in a collaborative context is a great way to build your network". CSF and CCC combined together with CCC's NGO GPP would be a potential platform to facilitate donors in assisting the right candidates. In this light, CSF and CCC are able to play the role of performing due diligence among local CSOs and bridge the credible CSOs with potential donors.

CSF will serve as a forum where innovative ideas will be implemented. For instance, one of our informants⁴² made a good point that NGOs collectively are able to manage their resources and ways of working more efficiently by, for instance, sharing working space and pooling resources (such as cars) wherever possible. Such an initiative would benefit all CSOs but needs a strong facilitation and coordination among different NGOs in order to arrive at that goal. CSF secretariat is a perfect candidate to accomplish the mandate.

CSF and Risks

First, CSF would require a coordinator that possesses a solid capability and personality. The useful capacity includes strong skills regard networking, lobbying, fund management, and mobilization not only at the local level but regional and internationally levels. Anecdotal evidences show that there are various funding opportunities beyond the national level, however, because they are not low hanging fruit, access to the fund requires more efforts and capacity on the side of local NGOs. Personality here refers to a person who has entrepreneurial skills to mobilize and raise fund yet would devote him/her efforts to achieve social values and goals and

⁴² Authors' personal interview with LNGO 12, Phnom Penh, August 09, 2017

not personal gains. Because such human resources are highly wanted by the burgeoning private sector that affords them high salary, keeping him/her to run CSF is never an easy job.

Second, while there is a clear justification for the emergence and existence of CSF, the secretariat will have to spend a lot more time and efforts to lobby CCC's members (especially those that see CSF's agenda overlapping theirs) and donors to buy in the idea of CSF. The concerns of various CCC's members and other donors that CSF will take away their work could be best mitigated by the experiences of such an organization like the Foundation for Civil Society in Tanzania. These days, the foundation runs on a USD **ten million** annual budget, suggesting some of the foundation's resources and work are withdrawn from several existing donors and foreign NGOs. Institutional collaboration between CCC and the foundation would erase the current concern of some foreign NGOs and donors that see CSF competing with them. That means CCC and CSF should develop institutional connection, so that CSF could learn from the Tanzanian foundation about how to avert the risks foreseen. In any case, if CSF proves to be more viable and long term tool for Cambodia's socio-economic development, those organizations should merge with CSF because eventually, every CSO in Cambodia serves this society and not any body's self-seeking interests.

Third, empowering the middle class, the rich, private sector and individuals is a possible venue but it requires time, patience, and long term commitment. At the same time, our interviews warn that many Oknhas are well connected with politicians of the ruling party; thereby, lacking financial freedom to contribute to CSF – they are willing to fund the Cambodian Red Cross but not CSF because their money is tied politically. Fourth, in the first few years, because the effects of CSF could be limited, the momentum of CSF is hard to sustain. Finally, CSF might be able to empower development-oriented NGOs but not those working in sensitive political issues such as democracy and human rights, land rights, and serious advocacy related to Chinese companies' negative impacts and well- connected powerful business elites and the like.

V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Cambodian CSOs over the last 2.5 decades have significantly contributed to promoting the country's development agenda. However, from around 2000, funding has declined by approximately 17 per cent, as a result less than 30 per cent of registered CSO remain active. Furthermore, donors in Cambodia have started to fund less local NGOs (targeting the established ones, neglecting the weak NGOs by withdrawing support), change their strategies by leaving NGOs in some provinces behind, support more of democracy and human rights NGOs than development oriented ones, shift the focus to supporting more of private sector development than NGOs generally, and fund foreign NGOs more than local NGOs. It is crucial to note that the recent closure of NDI might affect funding of several human rights and democracy NGOs that have excessively depended NDI's resources. At the same time, some established local NGOs, especially those whose missions fit well with donors' contemporary agendas, such as CCC, NGO Forum on Cambodia, PNKS, and NEP, have steady funding.

The sweeping change means disempowering a certain segment of Cambodian CSOs. Moreover, following 2.5 decades of donors' engagement in Cambodia, it is high time a local initiative undertook its mission to develop Cambodian civil society in a sustainable fashion. This clearly offers a reason for CSF to emerge with key objectives as follows:

- 1) serving as a Cambodian center which mobilizes, raises, and manage fund, as well as develops capacity for local CSO financial sustainability,
- 2) providing grants to some local NGOs that deserve support or some emergency activities falling out of the scope of current donors and various foreign NGOs, and providing sponsorship to multi-stakeholder initiative/projects for development where relevant,
- 3) empowering the local Cambodian (the rich, individuals, and the private sector) to pool fund for CSOs' operations, and
- 4) offering concessional loans to, say, Community Based Ecotourism so that CSF can endure and expand in the long run.

In this light, CSF's services and coverage comprise: 1) providing grants to service delivery local NGOs and CBOs that apply advocacy for farmers' rights in ways acceptable to the contemporary regime, 2) doing a long term awareness raising activity among potential donors and the public so as to raise fund for development works, 3) doing fundraising and funding mobilization work, 4) investing to financially sustain civil society activities, 5) providing training on networking

skills and grant proposal writing to investees, permitting them mobilize and diversify funding sources themselves, and 6) offering counseling and advice to needed NGOs.

CSF committee may consist of six members: a coordinator, one representative from CCC, one CCC's member, one donor representative, one representative from the private sector, and an abbot from a Buddhist pagoda. The roles and responsibilities of the CSF coordinator and CSF committee members have been outlined and are ready to be implemented. Legality, CSF should stay embedded with CCC so as to be protected financially and legally by CCC, especially in the early years of establishment. Currently, it is smart that CSF uses CCC's Board Directors, an issue that is not of urgent need.

Moving on, persuading donors to directly fund CSF is a feasible yet bold move. In the same way, in contemporary Cambodia the middle class, individuals, the rich, and Cambodian diasporas do not yet share a common understating about what they collectively could do to fight poverty, hunger and child malnutrition, reduce inequality, provide opportunities to disadvantaged kids, enhance gender equality, sustain the environment, and so on. These days they donate a lot of money to pagodas and less to Kuntheak Bopha Foundation, let alone CSF. Therefore, CSF represents a long term and painful commitment before these potential and sustained resources could be extracted. In this regards, for CSF to materialize, CCC is to be very serious and committed in this undertaking. The **following steps** should be taken:

1. Recruit an exceptionally knowledgeable, capable, and visionary coordinator, with a strong record of networking, communication, and management skills. Such capacity is necessary for the coordinator and CCC to lobby various donors, foreign embassies, potential members of CCC, scholars, potential individuals from the private sector, the government of Cambodia, and Buddhist abbots about the significance and demands of CSF. The coordinator additionally requires high entrepreneurial capacity to utilize and expand the existing fund of USD 150,000 in a manner that helps but not harm the society. When such a coordinator is in place, the impact of the first few years of CSF will be gradually felt by donors and local actors such as the rich, individuals, and private sectors that will pool resources for CSF to multiply and sustain.
2. The other five members of CSF committee will be supporting the CSF coordinator to smoothly kick start the project. They could be invited to join the CSF coordinator in lobbying donors to support CSF as well where appropriate.

3. Once the CSF coordinator and committee are set up and running, collectively, they could review and clarify their roles and responsibilities, outline what could be done in the first three years and beyond based upon the ideas laid out in this report.
4. A few years down the road, presumably with more resources in hand, CSF could hire its own staff to support the coordinator. Key positions include capacity building officer and grant making officer. With two other staff in place, the coordinator could retain the focus on leading the CSF in mobilizing and reaching out potential resources and donors, working closely with CSF committee to maintain the momentum of CSF, and casting a wider net to support local CSOs deserving CSF's support.
5. For CSF to represent a model of excellence in nurturing Cambodian civil society in a more productive ways than current arrangements, CSF may configure its identity, ideally as an *investor* of social change. SCF as an investor will share risks and success with *investees*—CSF works as a partner with grantees and not as a donor, builds capacity of investees to achieving self-reliance and autonomy.
6. The CSF coordinator, and possibly two other CSF committee members, are advised to do field visits to successful grant-making organizations such as those in the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Foundation for Civil Society in the Tanzania. Furthermore, locally, specific meetings between the coordinator with the leadership of Aide et Action and a few talented leaders of social enterprises, and potential successful business individuals is equally advised.

CSF inherently involves the politics of scarce resource mobilization and distribution; therefore, it requires a lot of preparation, innovative and robust efforts before it can take off. Optimistically, once the momentum of CSF is gained, current concerns will be gradually resolved. A similar initiative works in Tanzania and elsewhere, why does it not work in Cambodia?

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LIST OF APPENDICES

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Appendix 02: Major NGOs by Funding 2013-2015 (USD thousand) (CDC, 2016, p. 18)

Name	2013			2014			2015		
	NGO	DP	Total	NGO	DP	Total	NGO	DP	Total
Kantha Bopha Hospital	29,000	4,000	33,000	30,555	4,445	35,000	33,303	4,197	37,500
World Vision	23,564	2,897	26,460	21,474	2,634	24,108	23,928	2,877	26,805
Plan International	2,727	7,892	10,619	3,064	11,115	14,179	2,416	8,354	10,770
Khmer HIV/AIDS Alliance	-	7,629	7,629	-	7,381	7,381	-	7,409	7,409
Pour un Sourire d'Enfant	7,090	-	7,090	7,503	-	7,503	7,175	-	7,175
University Research Co., LLC	-	7,207	7,207	-	6,253	6,253	-	5,771	5,771
Angkor Hospital for Children	3,249	-	3,249	3,842	223	4,065	5,219	17	5,236
Japan Relief for Cambodia	5,081	460	5,541	4,446	487	4,933	4,892	313	5,205
Population Services Khmer	2,798	383	3,181	3,620	937	4,557	3,682	1,518	5,200
Netherlands Devt Organization	-	2,323	2,323	287	3,933	4,221	1,465	3,384	4,849
Hazardous Area Life Support	480	3,460	3,940	271	3,728	3,999	109	4,505	4,614
CARE International	693	2,199	2,893	796	2,642	3,438	1,303	2,856	4,159
Save the Children International	2,501	33	2,534	2,788	2,521	5,309	2,400	1,704	4,104
Hope Worldwide	2,485	-	2,485	3,400	-	3,400	3,760	-	3,760
The Fred Hollows Foundation	1,453	1,741	3,194	886	1,554	2,439	815	2,941	3,756
Child Fund Cambodia	1,494	454	1,949	2,320	285	2,605	2,888	590	3,479
Don Bosco Foundation	3,560	-	3,560	3,222	207	3,428	3,336	19	3,356
International Dev't Enterprises	1,696	1,993	3,690	1,470	2,319	3,788	1,147	2,183	3,331
Cambodian Children's Fund	4,966	-	4,966	7,768	-	7,768	3,131	-	3,131
DanChurchAid	186	933	1,119	614	3,218	3,832	716	2,390	3,105
Aide et Action	275	-	275	934	56	991	3,098	-	3,098
Room to Read	3,073	-	3,073	2,957	-	2,957	3,075	-	3,075
Jay Pritzker Academy	2,612	-	2,612	3,743	-	3,743	3,014	-	3,014
Total 23 largest NGOs	98,985	43,604	142,589	105,959	53,939	159,898	110,874	51,029	161,903
Total 43 other major NGOs	47,593	27,657	75,251	51,775	21,841	73,617	54,286	18,391	72,677
Other 373 active NGOs	79,365	26,707	106,072	73,683	31,974	105,657	62,387	15,210	77,596
Total	225,943	97,968	323,912	231,418	107,754	339,171	227,546	84,629	312,715

Appendix 03: The rising prominence of development NGOs

Until late 1970s: Development policy and practice was dominated by a state-driven vision of change. A limited number of small NGOs receiving little external support constituted the NGO sector. Most were northern-based with a southern presence, often based on religious assistance and/or in disaster/emergency relief.

Late 1970s to 1980s: „The NGO decade“ took place amidst the Western pursuit of neoliberal policies, putting markets first, with NGOs emerging as a promising alternative service delivery agent as private voluntary organizations (PVOs).

1990s: Alongside the emergence of the good governance agenda, there was a focus restoring the role of the state in development and there were initial concerns surrounding the levels of NGO contribution to development.

2000s: A new international aid regime promised greater consultation and focus on non-growth factors, bringing civil society in as a dominant actor in the development sector's landscape. NGOs with their people centred, rights-based approaches were well-suited to continue riding the NGO wave.

2010s: With persistent concerns about NGOs remaining unaddressed and evidence of their limited access in empowerment, there is increasing recognition that NGOs are only one sector of broader civil society and arguments are being made that they should reorient themselves towards the grassroots.

Source: Turner, Hulme, and McCourt (2015, p. 255)

Vision:

Sustainable development for Cambodia.

Mission:

As a membership based organization, CCC works in inclusive partnership for good governance, enabling environment and sustainability of civil society organizations in Cambodia.

Goal:

A strong and capable civil society, cooperating and responsive to Cambodia's development challenges.

Values:

- Integrity
- Responsiveness
- Cooperation
- Quality
- Inclusiveness

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🏠 House #9-11, Street 476, Toul Tompoung 1, Chamkamorn P.O. Box 885,
Phnom Penh, Cambodia

☎ T : +855 (0)23 214 152 F : +855 (0)23 216 009

✉ E : info@ccc-cambodia.org

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